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  This study examines the impact of corporate governance structure and free cash flow on over-
investment on 121 firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange over the period 2008-2011. To 
measure over-investment, free cash flow and corporate governance variables based on available 
information reported on financial statements are gathered and using cross section regression 
method, different hypotheses of the survey are examined. The results indicate that among 
corporate governance mechanisms investigated in survey, there is a significant relationship 
between percentage of non-executive directors and ownership concentration with over-
investment. However, there was no meaningful relationship among controlling shareholders 
and duality with over-investment. Furthermore, a significant relationship between free cash 
flow and over-investment has been found.       
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1. Introduction 
One of the primary concerns on stock market evaluation is to find suitable method for evaluating 
firms and there are literally different studies on firm evaluation and growth (Devine, 1983; Beneda, 
2003; Lian & Cheng, 2007; Kildegaard, 2008). Richardson (2006) for instance, investigated the 
extent of firm level over-investment of free cash flow and reported that over-investment was 
concentrated in companies with the highest levels of free cash flow. Further investigation examined 
whether firms’ governance structures were associated with over-investment of free cash flow or not. 
The evidence recommended that certain governance structures, such as the presence of activist 
shareholders, seemed to mitigate over-investment.    568
Xuesong et al. (2007) performed an empirical investigation on over-investment behavior and its 
restriction systems in China's listed companies. The results show that there were over-investment 
behaviors in China's listed firms. In addition, cash dividends and liabilities were effective restriction 
systems on over-investment behavior. In general, corporate governance could restrict over-
investment behavior. However, independent directors had no impacts on over-investment behavior. 
Mcmahon (2003) performed an exploratory study of under and over-investment amongst 
manufacturing SMEs from Australia's business longitudinal survey. They found some issues 
concerning the forms of manufacturing SME in terms of two disengagement configurations emerged 
in recent empirical development taxonomies for SMEs. Tao (2007) investigated the issue of 
corporate governance and over-investment of listed companies in China. Annual general meetings 
(AGMs) play essential role on corporate governance in the United Kingdom. Apostolides (2010) 
provided an analysis of AGMs and recommended different ways of making the event more effective 
from a stakeholder viewpoint such as providing a well balanced and independent range of skills and 
backgrounds on the board, accompanied by fair remuneration and reward schemes for the directors.  
 
2. The proposed study  
 
This study examines the impact of corporate governance structure and free cash flow on over-
investment on 121 firms out of 389 listed firms in Tehran Stock Exchange over the period 2008-
2011. To measure over-investment, free cash flow and corporate governance variables based on 
available information reported on financial statements are gathered and using cross section regression 
method, different hypotheses of the survey are examined. 
 
2.1. Free cash flow 
 
Free cash flow in this study is calculated as follows, 
 
Free cash flow = operating cash flow - capital expenditure - dividend. 
 
2.2. Over-investment 
 
In order to calculate over-investment, we first need to calculated new investments Inew,t , which is 
calculated through the following regression model 
 
I
*
New,t=	∝+	 1Qt‐1+ 2	        t‐1+ 3    t‐1+ 4     t‐1+ 5    t‐1+ 6              t‐1 + 7    t‐1+ε  (1)  
 
where Inew,t is the investment appears in future, Q is the growth opportunities, Tobin Q, which is 
calculated as follows, 
 
Market value + Net debt values
Net asset values
Q  .  
In addition, Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, Cash represent total available cash, 
Age represents natural logarithm of the number of years the shares of the firm were traded on stock 
exchange, Size denotes the natural logarithm of total assets, Stock Return represents the return of 
firms, INewt-1 represents the previous year’s new investments.  
2.3. Corporate Governance 
The proposed study of this paper uses the following regression model, 
,1 2 ,3 ,4 ,5 , , it it it it it it OI FCFF BIND BLOCK CONTROL DUAL            ,  (2)
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where BLOCK is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if institutional investors hold more than 
5% of total investment and 0, otherwise. In addition, CONTROL is another dummy variable, which is 
equal to one if an investor holds over 50% of the investment and zero, otherwise. DUAL is the next 
dummy variable, which is one if managing director is acting as chief executive simultaneously and 
zero, otherwise. Finally, BIND is the ratio of the number of non-duty members of the board of 
directors on total number of directors.  
The proposed study of this paper considers the following five hypotheses, 
1.  There is a meaningful relationship between BIND and over-investment. 
2.  There is a meaningful relationship between BLOCK and over-investment. 
3.  There is a meaningful relationship between CONTROL and over-investment. 
4.  There is a meaningful relationship between DUAL and over-investment. 
5.  There is a meaningful relationship between FFCF and over-investment.  
Table 1 demonstrates the summary of some basic statistics. 
Table 1 
The summary of some basic statistics 
Statistics    RETi,t-1   SIZEi,t-1   AGEi,t-1   CASHi,t-1 LEVi,t-1 Qi,t-1 Ii,t-1   Ii.t
Mean    2.006083    13.28335    2.492617    0.032279    0.670322    4.745318    1.073610    0.678890  
Median    0.380000    13.04376    2.484907    0.020219    0.656229    1.336609    0.035138    0.035367  
Std. Dev.    12.49473    1.574960    0.637678    0.034493    0.341803    20.02128    11.00755    5.940940  
Skewness    2.165369    0.800637   -0.116805    2.781021    2.584761    17.62807    17.30307    17.75449  
Kurtosis     22.88949    4.172159    2.842776    16.96638    16.70249    370.1665    329.5957    352.5077  
Bera - Jarque  10445.00    99.27136    1.998837    5696.987    5406.739    3429701.    2719029.    3111124.  
Sig.    0.000000    0.000000    0.368093    0.000000    0.000000    0.000000    0.000000    0.000000  
N    605    605    605    605    605    605    605    605  
 
In order to perform regression analysis, the study needs to find out whether the data are normally 
distributed or not. Fig. 1 demonstrates the residual of different variables, which indicate the normality 
of parameters. 
 
Fig. 1. The plot of residuals 
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The study also needs to make sure that there was no strong correlation among any pairs of 
independent variables. Table 2 demonstrates the results of our survey. 
Table 2 
The results of correlation among different pairs of variables 
  Ii.t   Ii,t-1   Qi,t-1   LEVi,t-1   CASHi,t-1   AGEi,t-1   SIZEi,t-1   RETi,t-1  
Ii.t   1.000000                
Sig.   -----                
Ii,t-1   0.009154   1.000000              
Sig.   0.8222   -----              
Qi,t-1   -0.004986   0.006664   1.000000            
Sig.   0.9026   0.8701   -----            
LEVi,t-1    0.055219   -0.007111   0.093185   1.000000          
Sig.   0.1750   0.8614   0.0219   -----          
CASHi,t-1   -0.025708   0.010460   0.014590   -0.063225   1.000000        
Sig.   0.5280   0.7974   0.7202   0.1203   -----        
AGEi,t-1   -0.007047   0.045928   0.022462   -0.083416   0.042200   1.000000      
Sig.   0.8627   0.2594   0.5814   0.0403   0.3001   -----      
SIZEi,t-1   -0.048391   0.003709   -0.198407   -0.134381   -0.156756   0.179274   1.000000    
Sig.   0.2346   0.9275   0.0000   0.0009   0.0001   0.0000   -----    
RETi,t-1   -0.021095   -0.000536   0.040029   -0.076030   0.045610   -0.002125   0.027455   1.000000  
Sig.   0.6046   0.9895   0.3256   0.0616   0.2627   0.9584   0.5003   -----  
 
The results of Table 2 show that there are not strong correlations between any pairs of data when the 
level of significance is five percent and we may perform the regression analysis.  
3. The results 
In this section, we present details of our survey on testing various hypotheses of the survey. First, we 
present the results of regression analysis on Eq. (1). Table 3 demonstrates the results of our survey. 
Table 3 
The results of regression analysis for the first model 
Variable   β Standard  error  t-student  P-value 
C   0.2723  0.070387  3.8686  0.0001 
Qi,t-1   -4E-04 0.000328  -1.22  0.2232 
LEVi,t-1    0.1638  0.059892  2.7344  0.0065 
CASHi,t-1   -0.944 0.277017 -3.408  0.0007 
AGEi,t-1   0.022  0.012886  1.7035  0.0891 
SIZEi,t-1   -0.017 0.004813 -3.545  0.0004 
RETi,t-1   -3E-04  0.001157  -0.238  0.8117 
Ii,t-1   0.0052 0.002494  2.078  0.0382 
AR(1)   0.0041  0.000328  12.361  0 
F-value  = 3.086 Sig.  = 0.002     Durbin-Watson = 2.079    Adjusted R-Square = 0.19  Jarque-Bera = 753.33 Sig. = 0.000  F-Limer = 1.056 
Next, we present the results of regression model for the second model. Table 4 shows the results of 
some basic statistics. 
Table 4 
The results of some basic statistics on the second model 
Statistics   DUALi,t   CONTROLi,t   BLOCKi,t BINDi,t FCFFi,t   OIi.t
Mean    0.089974    0.334190   0.987147 0.614396 0.504420  0.479054  
Median    0.000000    0.000000   1.000000 0.600000 0.009079  0.062257  
Std. Dev.    0.286513    0.472314   0.112787 0.163715 5.564294  6.454798  
Skewness    2.865860    0.703021   -8.649452 -0.111910 8.912527  19.25929  
Kurtosis    9.213156    1.494238   75.81302 2.648828 119.1951  376.4506  
Bera - Jarque    1158.181    68.79257   90782.68 2.810799 223983.4  2284549.  
Sig.    0.000000    0.000000   0.000000 0.245269 0.000000  0.000000  
N    389    389   389 389  389   389
 
Our survey indicates that there are not strong correlations among different pairs of variables. 
Therefore, we could present details of our findings on performing regression analysis on Eq. (2). Note M. Taghavi et al.  / Management Science Letters 4 (2014) 
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that we have examined different types of regression techniques and Table 5 shows details of six 
different methods.  
Table 5 
The results of regression analysis for the second model of the survey 
1
st model   2
nd model 3
rd model 4rd model 5
th model   6
th model
C  
Coefficient   0.268477   0.272410 -0.060269 0.679954 0.521904   0.161066
Sig.    (0.1488)   (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.2263) (0.2111)   (0.3818)
FCFFi,t   Coefficient   0.629090   0.839978   0.591928 -0.005630 -0.004905   0.478696
Sig.    0.0001   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3921) (0.4003)   (0.3542)
BINDi,t   Coefficient     -0.476102   -0.381839
Sig.      (0.0000)   (0.3837)
FCFFi,t×BINDi,t  
Coefficient     -2.512934   -0.202325
Sig.      (0.0000)   (0.2590)
BLOCKi,t   Coefficient     -0.784403   0.841285
Sig.      (0.0000)   (0.1947)
FCFFi,t×BLOCKi,t  
Coefficient     -0.247945   -0.373660
Sig.      (0.0000)   (0.3837)
CONTROLi,t   Coefficient     -0.573390   -0.646161
Sig.      (0.2749)   (0.2246)
FCFFi,t×CONTROLi,t
Coefficient     0.001314   -0.075890
Sig.      (0.8860)   02703
DUALi,t   Coefficient     -0.380335   -0.462823
Sig.      (0.2584)   (0.2240)
FCFFi,t×DUALi,t   
Coefficient     -0.127452   -0.171235
Sig.      0.4156   (0.7135)
 
For all models, all necessary statistics such as F-value, Durbin-Watson, Jarque-Bera are within 
acceptable limits and we can examine the hypotheses of the survey based on the results of different 
types of regression model presented in Table 5.  
3. The results 
In this section, we present details of our findings on testing various hypotheses of the survey.  
3.1. The first hypothesis: The relationship between BIND and over-investment 
The first hypothesis of this survey investigates the relationship between BIND and over-investment. 
Based on the results of Table 5 we have  c 0.476102, p-value  0.0000 0.05, t=5.7252>t 1.96. c p       
Therefore, we can conclude that there was a meaningful and negative relationship between BIND and 
over-investment and the first hypothesis of this survey is confirmed. 
3.2. The second hypothesis: The relationship between BLOCK and over-investment 
The second hypothesis of this survey investigates the relationship between BLOCK and over-
investment. According to Table 5 we have  0.784 P-value  0.00 <  0.05  t 4.298070 1.96. cc pt       
Therefore, we can conclude that there was a meaningful and negative relationship between BLOCK 
and over-investment and the second hypothesis of this survey is confirmed.  
3.3. The third hypothesis: The relationship between CONTROL and over-investment 
The third hypothesis of this survey investigates the relationship between CONTROL and over-
investment. According to Table 5 we have  0.57, P-value 0.2749 >  0.05, t -1.093415<  1.96. cc pt      
Therefore, we can conclude that there was not any meaningful relationship between CONTROL and 
over-investment and the third hypothesis of this survey is not confirmed. 
3.4. The fourth hypothesis: The relationship between DUAL and over-investment   572
The fourth hypothesis of this survey investigates the relationship between DUAL and over-
investment. According to Table 5 we have  0.38 P-value  0.2584  0.05  t 0.336032 1.96 cc pt        
Therefore, we can conclude that there was not any meaningful relationship between DUAL and over-
investment and the third hypothesis of this survey is not confirmed. 
3.5. The fifth hypothesis: The relationship between FFCF and over-investment 
The first hypothesis of this survey investigates the relationship between FFCF and over-investment. 
Based on the results of Table 5 we have  0.629 P-value  0.0001 <  0.05  t 3.979 >  1.96. cc pt     
Therefore, we can conclude that there was a meaningful and negative relationship between FFCF and 
over-investment and the first hypothesis of this survey is confirmed. 
4. Conclusion 
We have examined the effect of corporate governance structure and free cash flow on over-
investment on selected firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange over the period 2008-2011. The results 
have indicated that among corporate governance mechanisms investigated in survey, there was a 
significant relationship between percentage of non-executive directors and ownership concentration 
with over-investment. However, there was no meaningful relationship among controlling 
shareholders and duality with over-investment. Furthermore, a significant relationship between free 
cash flow and over-investment has been found. 
References 
Apostolides, N. (2010). Exercising corporate governance at the annual general meeting. Corporate 
Governance, 10(2), 140-149. 
Beneda, N. L. (2003). Estimating free cash flows and valuing a growth company. Journal of Asset 
Management, 4(4), 247-257. 
Devine, J. N. (1983). Underconsumption, over-investment and the origins of the Great 
Depression. Review of Radical Political Economics, 15(2), 1-27. 
Kildegaard, A. (2008). Green certificate markets, the risk of over-investment, and the role of long-
term contracts. Energy Policy, 36(9), 3413-3421. 
Lian, Y. J., & Cheng, J. (2007). Investment-cash flow sensitivity: Financial constraints or agency 
costs?. Journal of Finance and Economics, 2, 37-46. 
Mcmahon, R. (2003). An exploratory study of under and over-investment amongst manufacturing 
SMEs from Australia's business longitudinal survey. International Small Business Journal, 21(1), 
29-53. 
Richardson, S. (2006). Over-investment of free cash flow.  Review of accounting studies, 11(2-3), 
159-189. 
Tao, L. W. A. J. (2007). On corporate governance and over-investment of listed companies in 
China. Finance & Trade Economics, 12, 012. 
Xuesong, T., Xiaojing, S., & Rujing, M. (2007). Empirical research on over-investment behavior and 
its restriction systems in China's listed companies. Accounting Research, 7, 44-54. 
    